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Twenty Fifth Distinction
Question One. Whether Canonical Penalty Impedes Reception and Conferring of Orders
1. “It is wont to be asked if heretics etc 
.” [Lombard, Sent. IV d.25 ch.1 n.1].
2. About this twenty fifth distinction I ask two questions about those who receive orders: the first is whether canonical penalty impedes reception and conferring of orders.
3. That it does not:
If someone excommunicated or irregular attempt to confect, he does confect; therefore, by similarity, if an excommunicated or irregular bishop attempt to ordain or to do what the Church does, he does ordain; and if the recipient, being excommunicated or irregular, intend to be ordained, he is ordained. The consequence is plain by argument from similarity, because there seems to be similarity on this side and on that [sc. on the side of the ordaining bishop and of the ordained recipient]; and also by the argument a minori, because what does not prevent the execution of a nobler act does not seem to impede the execution of a less noble act.
4. Again, someone excommunicated or irregular is not so excluded from partaking of the other sacraments that he not receive them if he intend to receive them; therefore neither in the case of receiving orders. The consequence is plain by the argument from likeness. The antecedent is plain because someone irregular can receive the sacrament of penitence, otherwise salvation would be cut off from him.
5. Again, no canonical penalty excludes one more from some ecclesiastical rank or act than heresy does; but heresy does not so exclude, as is plain from Gratian, Decretum p.2 cause 1 q.1 ch.97.
6. To the opposite:
Gratian ibid. chs.108-110, “We altogether condemn simoniacs;” and later, “We decree that such receiving or conferring is invalid;” and, “Those who have knowingly permitted themselves to be consecrated, rather execrated, by simoniacs - we decree their consecration to be altogether invalid.”
7. Again, the Church can give the power of conferring orders (as is plain of consecrating a bishop); therefore the Church can take it away. Therefore the Church can inflict some tacit penalty on a bishop on account of which he would not be able to confer orders.
8. Again, the Church makes it illegitimate for certain persons to contract marriage, so that, if they attempt it, they do nothing. Therefore much more can the Church make a bishop illegitimate as to a spiritual act, such that if he attempt it he do nothing. The consequence is plain, because those things that are of positive right are said to be more subject to the Church than the things that are of natural and divine right; but any ordination of the Church through these dignities of the episcopacy and the like seems to belong to the positive right of the Church - at any rate it does not so much seem to be of the law of nature and the divine law as matrimony does.
I. To the Question
9. In this question one must first look at the canonical penalties that the question is asking about; second one must look at how, according to the canons, they exclude one from conferring or receiving orders.
A. About Canonical Penalties
1. About Canonical Penalty as it is here Understood
10. About the first [n.9]:
A canonical penalty, as we understand it in the matter at hand, is a penalty inflicted according to the canons, prohibiting or restraining the one punished from any ecclesiastical act that would otherwise be permitted to him (this last clause is added because for a layman it is no penalty that he not be able to confect the Eucharist, because this does not belong to him but to an ordained priest).
11. Now I said ‘according to the canons’ because whether a penalty be inflicted by a canon or by a judge and not by a canon, yet in order for it to be just it must be inflicted according to a canon.
12. And I said ‘prohibiting or restraining’ because the penalty we are now speaking of is understood either to constrain as a prohibition only or, if in any way to do more (which is discussed in the second article [nn.55-56]), that way is contained under ‘restrain’ or ‘constrain’.
2. About the Six Canonical Penalties
13. Now there are in specifically six canonical penalties of this sort, namely: deposition or degradation, infamy, irregularity, excommunication, interdict, suspension. About these in order: both about individual ones in themselves (and how they are incurred and by what remedy they are remitted), and by comparing them to each other as to seriousness and permanence.
a. About the First Penalty or about Deposition
14. The first, namely deposition, is the greatest, because it is the total removal from the clerical state. And if degradation be removal from every clerical rank, then deposition and degradation are the same thing. But if degradation is deposition only from a determinate rank, with however some other rank kept (as from the rank of the priesthood with some clerical rank remaining), then degradation is a penalty that is partial with respect to deposition.
15. But how is the one deposed removed from clerical state and rank? I reply: not because the character of order is taken from him, nor consequently the orders he received; but the license to execute the act of any order is taken from him, and he is also deprived of everything that belongs to the ordained. Hence such a one is handed over to secular care so that, as concerns ecclesiastical acts and the protection of ecclesiastical persons and as to forum, he is totally excluded from the number of ecclesiastical persons.
16. How is this penalty inflicted? I say that never by the law, but it has to be inflicted precisely by a judge. And the form according to which it has to be inflicted is contained in Boniface VIII Decretals Book Six, V tit. 9 ch.2. Now the causes for which it is inflicted are enormous sins, as heresy, schism, revealing confession. About the first is Gregory IX Decretals V tit.7 ch.9, about the second Boniface VIII ibid., tit.3 ch.1, about the third Gregory ibid., tit.38 ch.12.
17. How is it remitted? I say only through complete restoration by him who is able to restore, who is posited to be the Pope alone, although someone legitimately deposed is not read to have been restored afterwards.
b. About the Second Penalty or about Infamy
18. The second penalty is infamy, which is the state of injured dignity concerning life and morals, as reputation is the state of uninjured dignity concerning life and morals.
19. And this injury is incurred in diverse ways.
Here one needs to know that being infamous and being defamed are not the same thing. He is defamed who is publicly accused of some crime. But someone is not infamous because of such imputation of crime, but either because of a public crime publicly committed (as that if he has committed perjury or publicly committed any other crime because of which the law determines someone to be infamous), or because he is judged infamous by a judge before whom his crime is proved, such that everyone infamous has been publicly noted of a crime that the law punishes with the penalty of infamy. But sometimes one is not convicted of this in a court, and then one is infamous only by law and not by a judge; sometimes one is convicted and punished with such penalty by a judge, and then one is infamous in both ways, both by law and by judge.
20. From this the second point, how infamy is contracted, is clear. For the first infamy is contracted by the imposition of a crime that makes infamous; the second is incurred by law or judge punishing such crime with such penalty.
21. But what is the cause because of which infamy is incurred in the second way? Gratian, Decretum p.2 cause 6 q.1 ch.2: “We say that all those are infamous whom the secular laws call infamous.” Therefore, those secular laws that punish the crime of infamy are canonical laws, and those laws are contained in the Digest of Justinian, III tit.2, ‘Of those who are noted for infamy’.
22. What is the remedy against this penalty? I say that against infamy in the first way, when someone is defamed [n.19], there is a canonical cleansing, from Gregory IX Decretals tit.34 ch.8, ‘On Canonical Cleansing’. For the cleansing totally takes away the first infamy. Against infamy in the second or third way (which are as it were the same, though from diverse sources, law and judge) there is no remedy save complete restitution by him who can so restore it, ibid. tit.20 ch.54, ‘On Witnesses’, ‘Testimony’ [“He is turned away from testimony who has been convicted of or confessed a crime...; if he has not done penitence, let him be turned away even in a civil case”].
23. This penalty is graver, as to civil life, than deposition, unless deposition include it, because it is a prohibition against any legitimate act, even after penitence has been done, for such a person is base, Boniface VIII Decretals Book Six V tit. 42, “To the infamous the gates of dignity should not be open.”
c. About the Third Penalty or about Irregularity
24. The third penalty is irregularity, and this is unfitness for receiving and carrying out the acts of Orders.
25. This is incurred frequently by law, though it can sometimes be inflicted by a judge according to the laws. And it is incurred by law from certain crimes and from certain non-crimes and from certain that can sometimes be crimes and sometimes noncrimes.
α. Irregularity arising from Crimes
26. From crimes there are four that pertain to orders or to their acts. One of these is simony, another is theft in an order, a third is ministry in an order one has not received, a fourth is stubbornness in not keeping ecclesiastical penalties.
27. Simony can be either in an order or in a benefice.
But if it is in an order and knowingly, namely such that the one ordained know that he was ordained simoniacally, only the Pope gives dispensation, Gregory IX, Decretals V tit.3 ch.27, as was argued for the opposite [n.6]. For from the fact that the legislator does not altogether invalidate their consecration, it belongs to the Pope alone to relax [the penalty]. But if the one ordained is ignorant with invincible ignorance, as that his father paid the price for his being ordained, he is not made irregular unless, after it has been made clear to him, he carry out an act of the order so received. Hence after the fact about the order thus received is clear to him, he is suspended from act of the order until he is set free from such suspension.
28. But a simoniac in a benefice is not as seriously punished. However from when it is clear to him that he obtained the benefice simoniacally he is bound to resign it, and for the whole time he holds it unjustly he is bound to restitution of everything that he took part of. This is proved in diverse chapters by Gregory IX, Decretals V tit.3 ch.24, 26, 44.
29. About theft in receiving an order, draw distinctions: because either he is prohibited by the excommunication that someone may not come to the order save from that episcopacy and who has first been legitimately examined and received; or because there is no such excommunication or prohibition. And in both cases he who inserts himself furtively is irregular, but in the first case he cannot be dispensed save by the Pope; in the second he can be dispensed by the bishop. The proof is from Gregory IX, Decretals V tit.30 chs.1-2, ‘Of those who receive order furtively’.
30. About the third crime, that irregularity follows on it, is proved in Gregory IX, Decretals V tit.28 chs.1-2.
31. About the fourth there is ibid. tit.27 ch1.1-9, through the whole of it. And understand this with the greater excommunication, because as is contained there, ch.10, “although in a minor excommunication the celebrant sin gravely, yet he incurs the mark of no irregularity” - understand, even after he knew he was excommunicated.
For if he had invincible ignorance he would not be bound to keep away from the acts of order; nor would he, by exercising them, incur irregularity, as is contained in the gloss on Gregory IX, Decretals V tit.27 ch.9, namely if someone has excommunicated another by letter and wanted him to be excommunicated from the time of sealing the letter, he is not bound to hold himself to be excommunicated until the letter reaches him.
But if there not be invincible ignorance, nor incertitude in any way, as that by report or public rumor the penalty of excommunication has come to him, he is irregular, although he is to be treated more mildly. The proof is Gregory IX, Decretals I tit.7 ch.2, tit.27 ch.5. So too if the penalty of interdict not be kept, as is contained in ibid. tit.31 ch.18, ‘About the excesses of prelates and subordinates’, yet the chapter could be given a good exposition; irregularity also follows him who does not keep the suspension, as is contained in Boniface VIII Decretals Book Six V tit.11 ch.1, tit.14 ch.4.
β. Irregularity arising from Non-Crimes
32. Irregularity also follows three non-crimes, as servitude, Gregory IX, Decretals I tit.18 chs.1-8, ‘About not ordaining servants’, the whole of it. Now the reason is that a servant is the possession of the lord, and therefore ought not to be taken from him against his will; and when he is ordained he is unfit for certain servile acts. But if he has in fact been ordained, while the lord does not know and is again not consenting, the servant ought to be returned to him; however the lord should not apply him to acts that are not becoming his order, but he must serve the lord in acts befitting his status.
33. Irregularity also follows illegitimacy, Gregory IX, Decretals I tit.17 chs.1-2. And the reason is plain, because the illegitimate are presumed to be imitators of their father’s incontinence; they are also presumed to be ill compliant and badly educated. However, dispensation can easily enough be made for them; hence Benedict XI [d.1304] made dispensation easily enough for one such who without dispensation was ordained and was ministering in orders; I myself, for example, have seen the Bull of dispensation.73
34. It also follows the third non-crime, namely an unsightly or major mutilation or infirmity, as is contained in Gratian, Decretum, p.1 d.55 ch.13, ‘About not Ordaining the Disfigured in Body’, about someone with a gouged eye, and Gregory IX, Decretals III tit.6 chs.1-6, ‘About a Debilitated Cleric’. But if the mutilation is not disfiguring, and he himself was not at fault in the mutilation, he is not excluded, as is contained in Gratian, Decretum, p.1 d.55 chs.7-9, ‘If anyone by doctors’ and the two following chapters. But if he was at fault, as if he mutilated himself, as is contained ibid., ‘If anyone has cut off’, dispensation is scarcely made for such a one. Hence Nicholas IV [d.1292] with great difficulty dispensed someone such, although he was a religious. The like must be said of an egregious or non-egregious illness.
γ. Irregularity from Two Other Sources, at Times with and at Times without Fault
35. Two others follow, that can sometimes be with fault, sometimes without fault, namely homicide and bigamy.
36. Under homicide is contained egregious active mutilation of another. And on this matter is Gregory IX, Decretals V tit.12 chs.1-9, ‘On Voluntary and Involuntary Homicide’, and Gratian, Decretum, p.1 d.55 ch.13, d.50 ch.4, ‘I wonder’, and this because of the horror of shed blood. Hence even David did the Lord not permit to build a house for his name, by the much blood shed, II Kings [II Samuel] 7.1-17.
37. But distinguish here between voluntary and involuntary. Voluntary homicide is deleted only through baptism, and then there is fitting reason [sc. to allow ordination] because the reason [sc. not to allow it] is deleted, since a man now become new through baptism is not further to be held as an object of horror. But if the homicide is simply involuntary, as when another runs on a person’s sword, he is guilty in nothing; but if involuntary in a certain respect, as that he could not escape death unless he killed, he is irregular, Gratian, Decretum, p.1 d.50 chs.52-54.
38. But if it is accidental, and he was focused on something licit and used due care, he incurs no penalty; when the second of these conditions is not met, he does incur penalty.
39. As to bigamy, which does simply introduce irregularity, as will be said below in the material on marriage [infra d.33 nn.34-39], it is contained in Gregory IX, Decretals I tit.21 chs.1-7.
d. About the Fourth Penalty or about Excommunication
40. The fourth penalty is excommunication, about which there is what was said in distinction 19, the fifth article of the solution [dd.18-19 nn.67-80], and this as concerns the greater excommunication,a which is excommunication simply - for indeed the lesser excommunication is only excommunication in a certain respect, because it excludes from the communion of the faithful in a certain respect, namely in the sacraments.
a.a [Interpolation] The greater excommunication is exclusion of someone from the communion of the faithful - not indeed the bodily exclusion that happens in sequestration or incarceration or exclusion of that sort from others, but by excluding him through prohibiting him communicating with others and others with him.
41. Plain too is it from where it is incurred, because sometimes from the law sometimes from a judge. And indeed, it is sometimes possible to state the number from the law; nay, it was a small number when the Decretals were first compiled under Gregory IX [1234AD; from the Prolegomena to the Collection of Decretals]. But today who is sufficient to number them? And though the numbers are growing to infinity, with the growing movements of heads, it is not necessary to fill up whole pages about the matter.
42. However I say this, that it should not be inflicted by law or judge save for mortal sin, and not for any mortal sin but a grave one, a sin that stubbornness also accompanies; for as long as someone is ready to make satisfaction for fault and hears the Church, why is he to be regarded as a heathen or a publican? - since, according to Christ [Matthew 18.15-17], this penalty is inflicted as the ultimate one on him who does not wish to listen to the Church, who is finally stubborn.
43. Now it was stated above [dd.18-19 nn.66-68] who the minister of law is in inflicting this penalty; and, as for excommunicating simply, no one is suitable as minister save he to whom all the faithful are subject, and therefore no one else save as delegated with his authority.
44. How is excommunication relaxed?
I reply with an absolution given by him who did the excommunicating, if it is excommunication by a judge or by his superior.
45. But if it is by law, through absolution of him who established the law - and not this alone, as many say [Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, Richard of Middleton], but through absolution by any priest when the legislator not reserve the absolution for himself. And they prove it [Richard of Middleton] through Gregory IX Decretals V tit. 29 ch.29.
46. But this proof is of little force, because the inference ‘he does not reserve it, therefore he conceded it’ does not hold when speaking of form of consequence according to laws, because ‘able to absolve’ falls under the rule “what is not conceded seems to be prohibited” [a juridical axiom or ‘brocard’ cited, among others, by Henry of Ghent], because to absolve from a sentence of excommunication inflicted by a superior does not belong to anyone unless it have been conceded to him.
47. And comparing this penalty to the preceding penalty [sc. the third, irregularity], this one is simply more serious as to intensity, because it excludes from any communion that is otherwise permitted, while the preceding one excludes from those that pertain to orders; but this one is reckoned lighter because it is more easily remitted.
48. But it is to the opposite effect: for this one is more easily remitted for the reason that it is the most serious and excludes from more things. And these two penalties, namely of irregularity and excommunication, can be both public and private, and insofar as they can be private they are less serious than either of the preceding ones [sc. the first and second penalties of deposition and infamy], which two preceding ones are always public.
e. About the Fifth Penalty or about Interdict
49. The fifth penalty is interdict, which is restriction from exercising certain ecclesiastical acts, or from assisting in certain such acts. And although this penalty sometimes could be inflicted on a place and not on a person, sometimes on a person and not on a place, sometimes on both (and as it is inflicted so must it be kept), yet, as it is a penalty distinct from the rest, it is more frequently inflicted on a place and not on persons not yet in the place, as namely that in such a place it is not licit solemnly to celebrate divine service, or for others to take part.
50. And this penalty of interdict is sometimes contracted by law, sometimes by a judge. An example by law occurs about those who receive usurers from outside, Boniface VIII Decretals Book Six V tit.5 ch.1, “Abyss of usurers,” and for innumerable reasons. More usually, because of disobedience common to the people of a land, it is relaxed by him who imposed the interdict; sometimes it is relaxed in certain cases by law, as is plain in Boniface VIII Decretals Book Six V tit.11 ch.24, “Kindly Mother Church.”
f. About the Sixth Penalty or about Suspension
51. The sixth penalty is suspension, which is prohibition from an act otherwise suitable, and this for a time. And herein is this penalty specifically distinguished from the rest.
52. The penalty is also manifold: for one is suspension from office, one from a benefice, and one from entering a church; and the last is sometimes incurred by the law itself, Boniface VIII Decretals Book Six V tit.14 ch.1 and tit.11 ch.1.
53. And there is also suspension in receiving orders from a bishop who has renounced such place and dignity, for he who does not have the execution of orders does not confer the execution of orders; and so if he confer orders, and yet he who receives them does not have execution of them, he is therefore suspended, Gratian, Decretum, p.2 cause 1 q.7 ch.24, Gloss on Gregory IX, Decretals I tit.13 ch.1, ‘About those ordained by a bishop who has renounced the episcopacy’ [“He is suspended who receives orders from him who is suspended”]. Similarly about someone who is knowingly ordained simoniacally, as was said above [nn.27-28].
54. But it is removed by relaxation of such suspension done by him who put it in place, or by his superior.
B. How Canonical Penalties Exclude from Conferring or Receiving Orders
55. About the second main article [n.9] it is certain that the penalties do not impede in fact from conferring or receiving orders, as is proved by Augustine [Against the Letter of Parmenianus II ch.13 n.28] in Gratian, Decretum, p.2 cause 1 q.1 ch.97. And the reason is that along with those penalties can stand the idea of minister and of receiver, and the intention, and the other necessary things on this side and on that. But the penalties prohibit it in law, so that the contrary is illicitly attempted; however, if it is attempted, what is intended is done. Now the reason for this is that on the Church has been conferred the power of ordaining ministers for herself, as can be gathered from the words of blessed Paul to Timothy, where he describes what sort of persons should be ordained deacons [I Timothy 3.8-10].
56. But about the first penalty, namely degradation (especially if it has concerned a bishop), it is doubtful whether it exclude him in fact from conferring orders; but the pro and con are contained in the preceding question, the second article [d.24 nn.23-35].
II. To the Initial Arguments
A. To the Arguments of the First Part
57. As to the first argument [n.3], it can be conceded as to the first five penalties; but if, as to the sixth penalty, it be held that a deposed bishop is simply not a bishop, then as to that case the likeness in consequence is simply to be denied, because the character of priest is not taken away, nor consequently priesthood as it is episcopacy.
58. As to the next [n.4], intention does not suffice if there is not a suitable minister, a minister of the sort who is not deposed according to this opinion [nn.14-15].
59. As to the third [n.5], the case is not similar, because penitence is a general sacrament and therefore no one is excluded from it, either in fact or in law. The other sacraments, which include something of excellence, can well be denied to someone because of a transgression exacting it. As to the point about heresy [n.5], the point is true; it does not exclude in fact, but it does exclude in law if also such a one has not been condemned. But if he has been cut off and condemned by the Church he does not confer orders, provided episcopacy is not an order and could simply be taken away - as they would have to reply who hold episcopacy not be an order but a certain dignity added to orders, which dignity has regard rather to jurisdiction [d.24 n.30].
B. To the Arguments for the Opposite
60. As to the first argument for the opposite [n.6], I concede that the ordination of a simoniac is invalid as to execution, but he does receive order, and therefore he only needs it that his suspension be relaxed.
61. As to the second [n.7], the consequence does not hold, because it is given to a minister of the Church to be minister in conferring, not in taking away.
62. As to the third [n.8], it will be touched on below what the way is that the Church can make persons illegitimate and can thus make them unfitted so that they not be suitable for contracting marriage [Ord. IV d.37, q.1]. But here, from the fact that a character is conferred, there is no like power in taking it away.
63. And when the argument is made that that [marriage] is more according to the law of nature than this [ordination through a bishop], it is true in that a contracted marriage is ratified, but not that every person, notwithstanding any impediment, can contract the marriage. For it is more of the law of nature that what God impresses on nature, which is not repugnant to sin (either formally or to it as demeritorious cause), perpetually remain in the soul than that any man or any woman be fit to contract marriage. And therefore any unfitness of persons for this act [of marriage] is not as contrary to the law of nature as is a character impressed on someone being destroyed.
Question Two. Whether Female Sex or Childhood Impede the Reception of Orders
64. Second I ask whether female sex or childhood impede the reception of orders.
65. That they do not:
Galatians 3.28: For in Christ Jesus “there is neither slave nor free, neither female nor male;” therefore, there is no difference between male and female in the Law of Christ, as neither between slave nor free; therefore, a sacrament of the evangelical Law that a male can receive the female can as well, just as it is what slave and free can receive.
66. Again in Gratian, Decretum, p.1 d.32 ch.18 “Priest,” mention is made of a priestess,74 and ibid. p.2 cause 27 q.1 ch.23, “A deaconess should not be ordained before the age of forty.”
67. Also about childhood the argument that it does not impede [orders] is that it does not impede reception of other sacraments, as baptism and confirmation. And the point about confirmation seems most strongly to the purpose because that sacrament is given for the worthy confessing of the faith of Christ; this act cannot belong to anyone save to an adult, just as the act of orders cannot either; 
therefore etc .
68. To the opposite: ibid. p.1 d.23 ch.25, “That women or nuns sacred to God were handling the sacred vessels or sacred garments, carrying incense round the altar, was reported to the Apostolic See - and that all these things are full of reproof and censure is not doubted by anyone thinking rightly.” All ministry of a woman is full of censure.
69. Likewise, 1 Corinthians 11.6, “It is shameful for a woman to be shaven;” therefore also to receive orders, because tonsure accompanies orders, as a signifying sign.
70. Again, Gregory IX, Decretals III tit.1 chs.4-5, ‘About the life and honesty of clerics’, and Gratian, Decretum, p.1 d.23 ch.22; it is found there that clerics may not grow long hair but be tonsured.
71. Likewise about childhood there is found in Gratian, Decretum, p.1 d.77 ch.1, “Let not a subdeacon be ordained younger than 20 years old.”
I. To the Question
72. Here I say briefly that to be excluded from reception of orders, or not to be able to receive orders, can be understood in three ways: either not to be able duly and honorably, or not to be able licitly (because it is against a precept), or not to be able in any way, even in fact.
73. In the first way a child and he who does not have ‘years of discretion’ cannot receive orders, because he cannot receive with due reverence such rank as is conferred in ordination.
74. In the second way a child cannot receive Holy Orders, though he could in the second way receive lower Orders. The proof of the first is that to the reception of Holy Orders is annexed a vow of continence, as is contained in Gratian, ibid., d.28 ch.5; but a child and one who does not have ‘years of discretion’ does not have ability for that vow, either tacitly or expressly. The proof of the second is that no prohibition is found holding children back from receiving non-sacred Orders.
75. About the third ‘not being able’ [n.72] I say that ‘not being able’ is not found in a child, and this with respect to any Holy Orders; because the power to carry out some act, or the rank75 by which someone is able to carry out that act, can precede the act in duration or the power proximate to the act. Order is only a rank disposing one to being minister in a determinate ecclesiastical rank, as was said in the preceding distinction [d.24 n.19]. Therefore, it can belong to anyone before he is in proximate power (when the impediments are removed) for exercising the act; and consent is not there required for the impression of a character, as neither is consent required in minor orders.
76. However, this ‘not being able’ does exist in a woman. And this is not to be held as if it was something determined precisely by the Church, but it is obtained from Christ. For the Church would not have presumed, without her own fault, to have deprived the whole female sex of an act which could licitly belong to that sex, which would have been ordained to the salvation of the woman and of others in the Church through her -because this would seem to be a matter of very great injustice not only in a whole sex but in a few persons; and if now ecclesiastical order could by the divine law licitly belong to women, it could be for the salvation of them and of others through them.
And what the Apostle says to Timothy [I Timothy 2.12], “I do not permit a woman to teach in the Church,” meaning public teaching in the Church, is not a statement of the Apostle as laying down a statute. Rather I think that Christ did not permit it either. An evident argument for this is taken from the fact that neither did he put his Mother in any rank of order in the Church, with whom however no other woman was able or will be able to be equal in sanctity. Now there is a reason of some sort in agreement with this, and the Apostle indicates it in 1 Corinthians 14.34-35,76 for nature does not permit the woman, at least after the Fall, to hold an eminent rank within the human species, which indeed was said to her as punishment for her sin, Genesis 3.16 [“You will be under the power of the man;” cf. 1 Timothy 2.12-15].
77. Against this: where there is the same agent and a passive subject of the same species, the same effect is there; but a bishop is the same agent, and let it be posited that his intention is the same way here and there; man and woman, and the soul of man and woman, are passive subjects of the same species; therefore if, when the bishop does something, the soul of a man receive a character, it follows that when the bishop does the same thing concerning a woman, she will receive the same.
78. I reply:
The major is true of an agent inducing a form and is a natural agent; but if the agent act voluntarily and contingently, it is not true that it do the same thing, but it is able not to act. And if it not do the inducing but only does some act whereat another agent does the inducing and induces it voluntarily in the passive subject it proposes to induce in, the major is false. And so it is in the issue at hand. And this is a good argument that the minister does no necessary act on which the effect of the sacrament necessarily follows but only contingently, for the most part, by divine pact.
II. To the Initial Arguments
79. To the first argument [n.65] I say that, as concerns possessing grace and attaining glory, there is no distinction in the law of Christ between female and male, because she can have as much grace and attain as much glory as he can; but, as concerns possessing an excellent rank, it is well fitting that there is a distinction between man and woman in the law of Christ, because this is consonant with the law of nature.
80. To the second [n.66], perhaps in Greece, where priests licitly use a marriage contracted before [ordination], the wife of a priest can be called a priestess. But among us Latins, where there is not only conjugal chastity but chastity simply, priestess has been taken away. But some woman can be called a good matron, a widow, or perfect among other women, or perhaps in a college she who is superior over all the others, as an abbess among nuns. But by this she does not have a more excellent rank of order; nor indeed preeminence with respect to a man. The like can be said to the point about a deaconess, that she to whom, by ordination of abbess or the college, it belongs to read the homily at Matins can be said to be a deaconess; but that is not an act of any order.
81. To the next [n.67] it can be said as Gratian says in Decretum, p.1 d.4 ch.3: “In the case of the manners of those who use a contrary practice, several laws have been abrogated,” as he afterwards there proves through many examples, and especially when contrary manners rest on a new reason. So here. In the primitive Church children were not at once instructed in the things that pertain to divine cult and office; on the contrary, the fully adult were ignorant enough in such things. But now children are instructed and exercised at once in such things, and therefore someone of thirteen years is more sufficiently instructed now in such acts than perhaps was then a rustic of twenty-five years. And so it is not surprising that decrees about keeping to age limits have been abrogated.
82. And let it be that children should by right be assigned to due reception [of orders] in every way (which I do not believe), yet neither is it simply necessary to observe it by necessity of that precept, nor is it simply necessary by necessity of fact. Not but what if (setting this aside) order is conferred, it is truly received and a determinate rank of ministering in the Church is conferred - he being the author who, in this time, “from the mouth of babes and sucklings has perfected praise” [Psalm 8.3, Matthew 21.16]. To whom be honor and praise for ages of ages. Amen.